China–GCC Relations in an Emerging Multipolar Order

Key Takeaways

China–GCC Relations Have Become Structurally Embedded Across Multiple Sectors: China–GCC ties have matured into dense networks of multi-layered comprehensive cooperation. For the Gulf, China is a key partner in building post-hydrocarbon knowledge economies, advanced logistics corridors, and national industrial clusters. For China, GCC states are critical for energy diversification, secure maritime routes, Belt and Road expansion, and Global South diplomatic alignment.

Technology is Driving the Partnership’s Future Trajectory: While hydrocarbons remain essential, China–GCC technology ties are rapidly expanding. Chinese firms deliver integrated solutions that closely match Gulf diversification priorities. This deepening technological interdependence will be vital in the GCC’s modernization and economic transformation.

China and the Gulf are Cautiously Expanding Security Cooperation: China–GCC security cooperation is growing in visible but carefully calibrated areas: drones, missile technology, space, cybersecurity, and limited naval engagement. China supplies advanced UAVs and dual-use technologies, allowing GCC states to diversify their supplier base and strengthen leverage with Washington. Yet structural limits endure — the United States remains the Gulf’s core security provider, and China avoids assuming a primary defence role or entanglement in regional conflicts.

Emerging Multipolarity is Strengthening Gulf-China Cooperation: A less hierarchical global order has expanded GCC’s strategic flexibility, allowing deeper ties with China, though not without limits. For China, multipolarity facilitates expanded economic, technological, and diplomatic influence without direct confrontation with Washington. Gulf states gain autonomy, hedge U.S. policy risks, and advance industrial transformation.

Introduction

China–GCC relations have historically been characterized by a deep economic interdependence, primarily dominated by the Gulf’s energy supplies to China. In 2026, the vulnerabilities of this reliance were laid bare by the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, which underscored the fragility of global maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz.¹ Today, ensuring reliable energy supplies remains a core priority for China, and for the Gulf, the conflict has heightened the urgency of economic diversification, accelerating cooperation with China in renewable energy, green technology, and high-tech industries.

Nevertheless, this promising momentum is tempered by structural and political challenges. Internal divisions within the GCC, sustained pressure from the United States on dual-use technologies and security affairs, episodic domestic protectionist impulses, and the fresh uncertainties introduced by the 2026 regional crisis continue to constrain the pace and depth of strategic alignment.

The GCC States’ Rise as China’s Indispensable Partners

In recent years, the GCC states assumed an increasingly prominent position in China’s foreign policy agenda, as reflected in the deepening of economic, political, and strategic engagement across the Gulf region.² High-level exchanges between Chinese and Gulf leaders have become more frequent and substantive since Beijing’s launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, underscoring the relationship’s importance for Beijing. Chinese officials visited GCC countries more than ten times during this period, with a watershed moment occurring in December 2022 when President Xi Jinping attended the China-Arab States Summit and China–GCC Summit in Riyadh.³ Bringing together leaders from all six GCC member states, the summit elevated relations to a new strategic level and institutionalized collective dialogue on energy, trade, investment, and regional security.

Beijing’s engagement has also extended beyond the Gulf’s largest actors. During King Hamad Al Khalifa’s state visit to China in 2024, Bahrain-China ties were elevated from a partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership, signaling China’s intent to cultivate broad-based engagement across the Gulf. Diplomatic deepening has been reinforced by more liberal visa policies aimed at facilitating people-to-people and commercial exchanges. Mutual visa exemptions have long existed with the UAE and Qatar. In June 2025, Beijing introduced a unilateral visa-free trial for ordinary passport holders from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain, completing visa-free access across all GCC states.⁴

For Beijing, the GCC represents not only a cornerstone of energy security, but also a key transportation hub along Belt and Road corridors and an increasingly important commercial market. China has overtaken the European Union and the United States to become the GCC’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching record levels.⁵ Chinese exports, ranging from machinery and electronics to automobiles and renewable energy equipment, continue to meet strong demand across the region. As GCC states advance ambitious national development strategies, expanding infrastructure, technology, and logistics needs have created substantial opportunities for Chinese firms to position themselves as central partners in development projects.

The GCC states are also emerging as significant investors in China. Historically, Gulf sovereign wealth funds concentrated their portfolios in Europe and the United States, favouring conservative investment strategies centred on stable, predictable returns. In recent years, however, this approach has gradually shifted. GCC funds have shown a growing willingness to assume higher risk and diversify their investments geographically and sectorally.⁶ This shift reflects rising diversification pressures and a search for higher long-term returns.

As China and other Asian economies remain the principal destinations for Gulf oil exports,⁷ GCC sovereign investors have increasingly identified these markets as key sources of future growth.⁸ In line with this, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) now maintain extensive exposure to Chinese equity markets.⁹

Beyond the economic sphere, the GCC’s expanding political influence on the global stage significantly enhances its strategic value to China within an increasingly multipolar international order. Beijing views these states as influential middle powers that wield substantial leverage through mediation, economic diplomacy, and principled non-interference — approaches that resonate closely with China’s own foreign policy principles.

Qatar has been a central facilitator on various pressing regional files including Gaza and Iran,¹⁰ hostage releases, and humanitarian corridors, while Oman has quietly supported de-escalation in Yemen and back-channel dialogue involving Iran. Saudi Arabia hosted high-level talks on Sudan and contributed to prisoner exchanges and humanitarian initiatives in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.¹¹ Beyond the Middle East, the UAE played a key role in the 2018 Ethiopia-Eritrea reconciliation, and Qatar contributed significantly to the 2025 peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, leading Beijing to recognize them as indispensable partners, particularly as China seeks to expand its engagement with the Global South.¹²

Motivations behind the GCC States’ Pivot East

For the GCC states, China’s strategic importance has risen sharply in recent years, driven by a growing quest for geopolitical diversification and strategic autonomy.¹³ Despite their longstanding reliance on the United States for security guarantees, the Gulf states recognize the need to hedge their bets in an ever-more uncertain global landscape. This imperative intensified after Israel’s September 2025 airstrike on Doha, which targeted Hamas leaders in Qatar’s capital and killed several people, including a Qatari security official.¹⁴ The incident heightened concerns among Gulf leaders that U.S. security commitments may no longer be as ironclad or unequivocal as assumed.¹⁵ The 2026 U.S.-Israel-Iran war — combined with Washington’s perceived inability or unwillingness to adequately defend Gulf partners while prioritizing Israel’s security — will likely reinforce an already visible trend in Gulf foreign policy: the diversification of security partnerships and the pursuit of strategic autonomy through hedging.¹⁶

Second, with the spectre of renewed U.S. trade protectionism, escalating Western technology restrictions on China, and ongoing global supply-chain reconfiguration, GCC states are actively ‘looking east’ to diversify partnerships and reduce vulnerabilities.¹⁷ This pivot east has entailed enhanced cooperation with Asian partners such as Japan, South Korea, India, and prominently, China.

Third, the Gulf monarchies’ heightened focus on China is largely driven by Beijing’s energy needs amid a declining U.S. market. Washington’s shale revolution and rising Canadian supplies have pushed U.S. imports of Saudi crude to a 40-year low in 2024,¹⁸ prompting Riyadh to close its New York oil trading office, signaling a significant shift. In stark contrast, China’s crude imports reached an all-time high of 557.73 million tons in 2025,¹⁹ driven by growth in transportation and digital infrastructure. Imports from the UAE nearly doubled in October 2025 year-on-year (from 2.05 million to 3.82 million tons), while Kuwaiti flows surged from 970,000 tons to 2.36 million tons in the same period.²⁰

Fourth, the remarkable alignment between the GCC’s economic diversification strategies and China’s capabilities is drawing both sides closer together.²¹ Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, the UAE’s We the UAE 2031, and Qatar’s National Vision 2030 all seek to reduce oil dependence by promoting high-tech industries, advanced manufacturing, logistics, finance, tourism, and renewable energy. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides the infrastructure capabilities, technology transfer, and investment needed to advance these agendas. As a result, Chinese firms are flocking to the region and have become preferred partners for flagship projects — from NEOM and Dubai’s port expansion to 5G and AI networks — underscoring that the GCC’s eastward pivot reflects a durable strategic reorientation rather than a temporary adjustment.²²

New Engines of the China–GCC Partnership

Historically, the bilateral relationship between China and the GCC states has been predominantly anchored in energy dynamics: China, as the world’s main energy importer, has relied on the GCC’s vast oil and natural gas reserves to fuel its economic ascent, while the Gulf nations benefited from a stable and expansive market for their exports. Yet, in recent years, this partnership has transcended its transactional roots, evolving into a multifaceted partnership encompassing innovation, technology transfer, and shared development goals.²³

The GCC states, as global energy epicentres with unparalleled hydrocarbon reserves, are simultaneously pioneering a shift toward renewables. By 2026, this transition has materialized considerably: Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among the fastest-growing in utility-scale solar additions in the Middle East, reshaping their energy matrices to emphasize sustainability.²⁴ Such advancements yield low-cost electricity — far below levels in the European Union or the United States — ideally suited to powering energy-intensive high-tech endeavours, including AI model training, data centres, and cloud computing.

Such an infrastructural advantage positions the GCC as a prime platform for economic diversification, enabling high-tech sectors — especially artificial intelligence — to thrive amid abundant resources and low operational constraints. Sparse populations and expansive territory facilitate large-scale data centres and immersive applications, while the region’s strategic location at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, and Africa — anchored by hubs such as Dubai and Jeddah — strengthens global connectivity and supply-chain integration.

China’s extensive high-technology capabilities, integrated industrial ecosystems, and competitive cost structures position it as a key partner in this process. In his 2016 address at the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, President Xi Jinping articulated a transformative framework for Sino-Arab collaboration under the BRI.²⁵ Invoking the principles of “peace, innovation, leadership, governance, and integration,” Xi positioned China not merely as a trade partner but as “a catalyst for Middle Eastern progress” — a promoter of regional industrialization and a steward of equitable growth.²⁶ This vision underscored Beijing’s commitment to fostering innovation and robust governance structures, manifesting in targeted cooperative domains such as high-end manufacturing, nuclear energy, aerospace, renewable energy sources, genetic engineering, information and communications technology (ICT), joint research laboratories, and the China-Arab States BeiDou Cooperation Forum.

Compared with many Western counterparts, Chinese cooperation is often characterized by fewer political conditions attached to technology transfer, contributing to a transactional environment that has facilitated the expansion of high-technology ties. Therefore, while maintaining a pro-US strategic orientation, the Gulf states view deepened ties with China as a complementary diversification. Emblematic partnerships include Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) channeling resources into Chinese AI firms including DeepSeek and SenseTime to establish joint laboratories;²⁷ the December 2025 launch of the UAE-813 Satellite aboard China’s Lijian-1 Y11 rocket;²⁸ and the signing of a monumental $5 billion investment agreement between Beijing and Abu Dhabi.²⁹ These ventures support faster technological adoption and point to a convergence of interests around innovation autonomy in a more contested global technology landscape.

At its core, the high-tech collaboration model between China and the GCC revolves around a symbiotic exchange: Gulf sovereign wealth funds — such as Saudi Arabia’s PIF and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) — invest strategically in Chinese AI enterprises, while leveraging low-cost energy to support domestic digital infrastructure. China contributes advanced algorithms, engineering expertise, and integrated solutions that support GCC efforts to translate energy abundance into computational capacity. This evolution toward ecosystem-based cooperation is exemplified by the $5 billion China–UAE partnership, which has begun supporting joint laboratories, data centers, and innovation hubs, deepening institutional ties between China and the UAE.³⁰

The 2026 U.S.-Israel-Iran war has deepened China–GCC interdependence, turning a longstanding alignment into a more urgent strategic imperative. As the world’s largest crude importer, China faces heightened pressure to secure stable energy supplies amid disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. For Gulf states, strikes on energy infrastructure and maritime routes have reinforced the urgency of economic diversification, placing key initiatives — such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the UAE’s Net Zero 2050 strategy — under strain.

In response, Gulf leaders are intensifying cooperation with China, viewing sustained Chinese investment as critical to advancing diversification and reinforcing market confidence.³¹ These investments supply vital capital and technological expertise to accelerate diversification projects while reinforcing market confidence by signalling regional resilience to global investors.

Expansion of China–GCC Security Cooperation

While the United States remains the GCC’s primary security guarantor, China has consistently framed its engagement as complementary rather than as a challenge to U.S. primacy. This deliberate positioning provides the Gulf states with valuable strategic space to balance their longstanding reliance on U.S. security guarantees with expanding economic, technological, and strategic partnerships with China. More fundamentally, these dynamics should be understood within the broader context of an evolving global order. While references to a multipolar world have become commonplace, the contemporary international system is more accurately described as post-hegemonic — characterized by fragmentation, strategic uncertainty, and increasingly contested forms of leadership.

Although several rising powers have expanded their influence, none have emerged as a fully consolidated pole capable of assuming the broader stabilizing functions historically associated with a dominant hegemon. It is within this fluid and unsettled environment that the GCC states have exercised growing strategic autonomy, viewing Beijing not as a substitute for Washington but as a complementary partner capable of supporting economic diversification, technological upgrading, localized industrial production, human capital development, and cooperation in emerging and non-traditional security domains.

Central to this process is the expansion of military-technical cooperation and the localization of defence production. Drawing on Chinese expertise, GCC states are narrowing capability gaps, accelerating defence modernization, and reinforcing domestic defence-industrial ecosystems. An example is the near-completion of a joint munitions factory between Kuwait and China³² — a collaborative effort that signals growing GCC-China military ties while also directly enhancing local production capacity, gradually reducing exposure to external supply-chain risks and disruptions.

Similar efforts are underway in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where partnerships with major Chinese firms such as the China North Industries Group Corporation (Norinco) routinely incorporate technology-transfer arrangements, enabling the localized integration and eventual production of advanced systems, including drones, precision-guided munitions, and cyber-defense platforms.³³ This pattern underscores the Gulf states’ pursuit of greater defense self-reliance. Alongside these developments, weapons procurement and capacity-building cooperation has expanded, with China emerging as a supplier of military equipment and training to GCC states, meeting demand for cost-effective systems and flexible procurement terms.³⁴

Beyond conventional defense, Sino-GCC security cooperation has expanded into non-traditional domains linking economic interdependence with risk mitigation.³⁵ China contributes to maritime security through escort operations safeguarding key sea lanes, including the Strait of Hormuz, thereby supporting energy-flow stability. Joint counter-terrorism initiatives further reinforce this approach. In 2025, the expansion of China–Oman security relations marked a qualitative shift, strengthening bilateral trust and enhancing Oman’s role in regional security coordination.³⁶ Overall, while China’s contributions strengthen GCC hedging and diversification, they remain constrained by Beijing’s aversion to direct military commitments or entanglement in regional conflicts.

Challenges for China–GCC Relations

While Sino-GCC relations continue to expand across trade, investment, and technology, they remain subject to significant structural and political constraints that limit both the pace and depth of strategic alignment.

First, longstanding internal divisions among GCC members continue to impede the emergence of a coherent, collective approach toward China. Despite repeated high-level summits and a shared interest in economic diversification, the six states display divergent priorities, capabilities, and threat perceptions that undermine bloc-level initiatives. A clear illustration is the China–GCC Free Trade Agreement (FTA).³⁷ Negotiations, which began in 2004, have advanced fitfully for more than two decades and remained inconclusive as of late 2025.

Second, Gulf capitals face growing pressure from Washington, their principal security guarantor, which increasingly views deepening ties with China — particularly in dual-use technologies, artificial intelligence, telecommunications, and other frontier sectors — with strategic concern. This evolving environment makes the practice of hedging more complex and potentially more costly. The United States has repeatedly signalled that extensive technological or security cooperation with Beijing could affect intelligence-sharing arrangements, access to advanced technologies, and future defence cooperation.

A notable example is the case of the UAE-based artificial intelligence firm G42, which, under sustained U.S. pressure in 2023–2024, reduced its ties with Chinese entities and deepened cooperation with American partners, including Microsoft.³⁸ These developments illustrate the increasingly constrained nature of Gulf hedging as Sino-American competition intensifies and technological interdependence becomes more closely linked to geopolitical rivalry.

Compounding these challenges are emerging protectionist pressures within the GCC itself. As concerns over competitive pressures from Chinese imports have grown, Gulf industries have increasingly turned to trade-defense instruments to shield domestic producers. In December 2025, the GCC Bureau of Technical Secretariat for Anti-Injurious Practices in International Trade imposed anti-dumping duties on car batteries (namely lead-acid batteries used to start piston engines) from China and Malaysia following complaints by domestic Gulf producers alleging significant dumping and a sharp increase in import volumes.³⁹

An inquiry concluded that the imports had caused material injury to domestic producers, evidenced by price suppression, declining sales and market share. More broadly, this episode highlights a structural tension within China–GCC economic relations: while Gulf governments welcome Chinese capital, technology, and infrastructure investment, they remain sensitive to the competitive impact of Chinese exports on efforts to develop indigenous industrial capacity.

Conclusion

The China–GCC partnership has evolved beyond its traditional hydrocarbon foundations into a multifaceted relationship that increasingly shapes economic, technological, and strategic dynamics across the Middle East and Asia. While energy remains central, cooperation now encompasses infrastructure, digital technologies, renewable energy, advanced manufacturing, and industrial development. These expanding linkages support Gulf diversification strategies while securing China’s energy needs and advancing the Belt and Road Initiative.

Significantly, they reflect a deepening structural interdependence rooted in the changing contours of the global political economy, where both China and the Gulf states seek greater autonomy, diversified partnerships, and reduced dependence on any single external actor. This convergence of interests has elevated the relationship from a predominantly transactional exchange to a broader strategic partnership with growing regional and global significance.

Nevertheless, the momentum of China–GCC cooperation remains constrained by a range of structural and political challenges. Persistent divergences among GCC members, sustained U.S. pressure regarding security cooperation and dual-use technologies, and periodic protectionist responses to Chinese imports continue to limit the pace and depth of regional coordination with Beijing.

Moreover, the regional security environment has become increasingly volatile. The 2026 U.S.-Israel-Iran war has also further heightened perceptions of strategic vulnerability across the Gulf, compelling regional governments to focus on immediate security concerns and crisis management. While this development does not fundamentally alter the trajectory of China–GCC relations, it may temporarily shift policy priorities away from long-term economic transformation and technological cooperation. As a result, the increasingly complex interplay between geopolitical instability and economic interdependence is likely to shape the future evolution of China’s engagement with the Gulf.

The China–GCC partnership is therefore best understood not as evidence of a wholesale geopolitical realignment, but as a manifestation of the adaptive strategies pursued by middle and rising powers in an increasingly fragmented international system. Its future trajectory will be shaped less by ideological affinity than by the continued convergence of economic interests, the evolution of Sino-American competition, and the Gulf states’ efforts to balance strategic autonomy with enduring security dependencies.

Endnotes

¹ “Oil Market Report (March–April 2026),” International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-april-2026.

² Adel Abdel Ghafar, Sino-GCC Relations: Past, Present, and Future Trajectories, Issue Brief (Doha, Qatar: Middle East Council on Global Affairs, June 2022), https://mecouncil.org/publication/china-gcc-relations-past-present-and-future-trajectories-2/.

³ “What Message Did Xi Jinping Send to the World by Attending Two Historic Summits?” People’s Daily, December 10, 2022, http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2022/1210/c1001-32584685.html.

⁴ “China to trial visa-free policy for Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain,” The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, May 28, 2025, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202505/28/content_WS68390156c6d0868f4e8f2f9b.html.

⁵ “The Middle East Pivot to Asia — The Gulf’s Rise as a Global Middle Power,” Asia House, November 13, 2025, https://www.asiahouse.org/research-insights-publications/the-middle-east-pivot-to-asia/.

⁶ Karen E. Young, “Sovereign Risk: Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds as Engines of Growth and Political Resource,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2020, p. 4.

⁷ Robert Mogielnicki, “Evolving Chinese Demand for Gulf Oil and Gas,” Arab Gulf States Institute, July 20, 2022, https://agsi.org/analysis/evolving-chinese-demand-for-gulf-oil-and-gas/.

⁸ Frédéric Schneider, The GCC’s Evolving Trade Networks: Navigating Fragmentation and Diversification, Policy Paper (Doha, Qatar: Middle East Council on Global Affairs, January 2026), https://mecouncil.org/publication/the-gccs-evolving-trade-networks-navigating-fragmentation-and-diversification/.

⁹ Mai Alfarhan and Mohammed Alsudairi, “The Past, Present, and Future of Gulf Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in China,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 31, 2024, p. 79.

¹⁰ Anna Mier y Teran, “Handling Israel-Hamas war mediation: The role of Qatar,” Universidad de Navarra, May 15, 2024, https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/handling-israel-hamas-war-mediation-the-role-of-qatar.

¹¹ Hussien Elkabany, Betul Yilmaz, Adel Abdelrheem, and Rania Abu Shamala, “Saudi crown prince, Sudan’s Burhan discuss efforts to achieve stability,” Anadolu Ajansi, December 15, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/saudi-crown-prince-sudan-s-burhan-discuss-efforts-to-achieve-stability/3771780.

¹² Roa Al Shidhani and Saranjam Baig, “Balancing power and prosperity: China’s geo-economic engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council,” Asian Review of Political Economy (2024) 3:20, pp. 2–28, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44216-024-00040-6.

¹³ Jeffrey Reeves, “China’s Expanding Influence in the Middle East and North Africa,” The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, February 24, 2025, https://peacediplomacy.org/2025/02/24/chinas-expanding-influence-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/.

¹⁴ Helen Regan, “Israel strikes Hamas leadership in Qatar in unprecedented attack. Here’s what to know,” CNN, September 10, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/10/middleeast/israel-strikes-hamas-qatar-explainer-intl-hnk.

¹⁵ “Gulf Security After the Israeli Strike on Doha: Waning US Guarantees and Expanding Options,” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, October 2, 2025, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/gulf-security-after-the-israeli-Strike-on-doha.aspx.

¹⁶ Annelle Sheline, “Are Qatar and Saudi Arabia Reassessing Their Reliance on the US?” Quincy Institute, Brief 94, February 26, 2026, https://quincyinst.org/research/are-qatar-and-saudi-arabia-reassessing-their-reliance-on-the-us/.

¹⁷ Layla Ali, “Middle Powers in a Multipolar World: The Evolving Role of Gulf States in Global and Regional Order,” Gulf Research Center, October 15, 2025, https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/317.

¹⁸ Javier Blas, “US Reliance on Saudi Oil is Nearing its Endgame,” The Business Times, January 14, 2025, https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion-features/us-reliance-saudi-oil-nearing-its-endgame.

¹⁹ Sam Li and Lewis Jackson, “China’s 2025 Oil Imports, December Inflows both Hit Record Highs,” Reuters, January 14, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-2025-oil-imports-december-inflows-both-hit-record-highs-2026-01-14/.

²⁰ “China’s Crude Oil Imports from the Middle East Hit a Record High,” Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, January 20, 2026, https://wtocenter.vn/chuyen-de/29078-chinas-crude-oil-imports-from-the-middle-east-hit-a-record-high.

²¹ Umud Shokri, “The China-GCC Equation: Energy, Critical Minerals, and Geopolitical Strategy,” Gulf International Forum, December 3, 2025, https://gulfif.org/the-china-gcc-equation-energy-critical-minerals-and-geopolitical-strategy/.

²² Rami Nazer, “Chinese enterprises expand steadily into the Middle East market with heightened confidence,” PwC, September 8, 2025, https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/publications/2025/docs/chinese-enterprises-expand-steadily-into-the-middle-east-market-with-heightened-confidence.pdf; Yuan Zhang, “Two Pillars, One Gulf: China’s High-Stakes Balancing Act between Iran and the GCC,” Gulf Research Center, December 3, 2025, https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/338.

²³ Haihong Gao, “Beyond Energy: The Future of China-GCC Economic Ties,” Arab Gulf States Institute, October 1, 2018, https://agsi.org/analysis/beyond-energy-the-future-of-china-gcc-economic-ties/.

²⁴ Patrick Jowett, “MENA Region Installs 12.2 GW of Solar in 2025,” PV Magazine, January 15, 2026, https://www.pv-magazine.com/2026/01/15/mena-region-installs-12-2-gw-of-solar-in-2025/.

²⁵ “Xi Jinping’s speech at the headquarters of the League of Arab States,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, January 22, 2016, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zyjh_674906/201601/t20160122_7945573.shtml.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ “DeepSeek | China’s AI Global Breakthrough and Ecosystem Restructuring,” Equal Ocean, March 19, 2025, https://equalocean.com/analysis/2025031921426; “SenseTime’s Arabian Gambit: A Case Study in Chinese AI Expansion in the Middle East,” UAE-China Chamber of Commerce (UECN), September 27, 2025, https://uecn.org/sensetimes-arabian-gambit-a-case-study-in-chinese-ai-expansion-in-the-middle-east/.

²⁸ Chen Na, “Arab Satellite 813 Launch Marks Milestone in China-UAE Space Ties,” Chinese Academy of Sciences, December 12, 2025, https://english.cas.cn/newsroom/cas_media/202512/t20251216_1137266.shtml.

²⁹ “Investment and Innovation Ecosystems: A New Era of China-UAE AI Cooperation,” UAE-China Chamber of Commerce (UECN), September 27, 2025, https://uecn.org/investment-and-innovation-ecosystems-a-new-era-of-china-uae-ai-cooperation/.

³⁰ “Energizing the Future: AI’s Role in the China-UAE Renewable Energy Push,” UAE-China Chamber of Commerce (UECN), September 27, 2025, https://uecn.org/energizing-the-future-ais-role-in-the-china-uae-renewable-energy-push/.

³¹ Khalid Azim, “After the Iran war, the Gulf’s next economic phase awaits,” Atlantic Council, May 19, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/after-the-iran-war-the-gulfs-next-economic-phase-awaits/.

³² Ziwen Zhao, “China and Kuwait Pledge Closer Military Ties as Joint Ammunition Plant Opening Nears,” South China Morning Post, August 1, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3320295/china-and-kuwait-pledge-closer-military-ties-joint-ammunition-plant-opening-nears.

³³ “Saudi Arabia: Update on SAMI-Norinco Arms Package,” Tactical Report, December 7, 2023, https://www.tacticalreport.com/daily/62382-saudi-arabia-update-on-sami-norinco-arms-package.

³⁴ “44th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Concludes Visit to Oman,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, October 16, 2023, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/OverseasOperations/EscortMissions/16259035.html.

³⁵ Bima Jon Nanda, “China’s Normative Balancing: Global Security Initiative and Middle East Security Architecture,” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Vol. 19, Issue 3, 2025, pp. 33–60.

³⁶ Jesse Marks, “China and Oman: Strategic Partner or Future Security Dilemma?” Substack, March 13, 2025, https://jessemarks.substack.com/p/china-and-oman-strategic-partner.

³⁷ Alex Gintz, “Where is the China-GCC Free Trade Agreement?” The Asia Cable, December 16, 2025, https://www.theasiacable.com/p/where-is-china-gcc-free-trade-agreement.

³⁸ Mohammed Soliman, “China, the US, and the Battle for Middle Eastern Technology,” Middle East Institute, May 20, 2024, https://mei.edu/publication/china-us-and-battle-middle-eastern-technology/.

³⁹ “GCC Imposes Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Automotive Batteries from China, Malaysia,” Saudi Press Agency, December 7, 2025, https://www.spa.gov.sa/N2460581.