Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s second visit as premier to the Syrian capital, Damascus, should not be seen as a fleeting diplomatic moment, but should be viewed within the broader geopolitical context, as part of a determined, strategic attempt to reorganize and reformulate Syrian-Lebanese relations at a pivotal historical juncture marked by radical regional and international transformations.  

Beirut and Damascus have historically not enjoyed the stability typically found in diplomatic ties between two neighboring states. Their relationship has always been complex, marked by a highly sensitive interplay between state and non-state actors, the intersection of geography and national security, alongside sovereignty and transnational networks. This model is further complicated by the intertwining of political and historical dimensions, the economic constraints imposed by regional conflicts, and the weight of demographics and sectarian divides. 

Moreover, the relationship has not been managed through official diplomatic channels or formal institutions in recent decades, but in superficial terms and within narrow limits. Their history is replete with agreements concluded outside the framework of equitable sovereignty, notably the 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination and other accords signed that year, which legitimized Syria’s unilateral influence in Lebanon’s political and security decision-making. 

Over the decades, the relationship operated through a complex, parallel security and political system that includes powerful intelligence agencies, local political parties and sectarian forces, transnational smuggling networks, and the illicit cross-border economy. Given this complex reality, any stated desire to turn a new page or to embark on stable relations between the two countries remains contingent on both sides’ ability to address outstanding issues that have accumulated over decades, producing a chronic lack of trust. 

Seen in this light, recent meetings and visits between Lebanese and Syrian officials are exceptionally significant, transcending traditional frameworks, especially given developments such as the reactivation of joint technical committees and ministerial engagement on key files including energy, the economy, border security, and trade. This expanding engagement reveals a mutual, inevitable realization among the ruling elites in Beirut and Damascus that continued political estrangement or hostility is no longer a realistic or feasible option.  

This realization is fueled by Lebanon’s protracted economic and financial crisis since 2019, and Syria’s urgent need to restore political and economic stability after years of a catastrophic civil war and stifling international isolation. However, the most sensitive and fundamental question remains: Does the current political dynamic reflect a genuine intention by both countries to redefine their relations on the principles of equality, shared interests, and mutual respect for national sovereignty? Or are these merely temporary arrangements dictated by strategic necessity without addressing the deep-rooted historical crisis between the two countries? 

The Conflict of Memory 

The fundamental political obstacle in Syrian-Lebanese relations is the mutual distrust that has persisted throughout their modern history. This has challenged efforts to restore or rebuild trust. Lebanon’s various political camps continue to view the country’s relationship with Damascus through the lens of a long and painful legacy of Syrian political and security dominance which extended from the Syrian army’s entry into Lebanon in 1976, as part of the Arab League-mandated Arab Deterrent Force, until its complete withdrawal on April 26, 2005 as a result of the Cedar Revolution in the wake of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. This era is extensively documented in the United Nations reports monitoring the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1559.  

Throughout those three decades, Damascus was the de facto ruling power in Lebanon, controlling the country’s political and security decisions. Syria dictated the appointment of presidents and the formation of successive governments, as well as imposing major strategic choices on Lebanese foreign and domestic policy.  

Despite the transformation of the regional order and the collapse of many of the frameworks that had dominated the region over that period, a significant portion of Lebanon’s political and social elite still view Damascus as a potential threat rather than a natural strategic partner.  

Lebanon is accordingly approaching the current rapprochement with extreme caution, and within the limits imposed by its own highly sensitive domestic balances. This explains the Lebanese president’s reticence, to date, to communicate directly with the Syrian leadership, leaving the task of political communication and executive coordination to the prime minister and relevant ministers. This division of roles also reflects the depth of internal Lebanese divisions regarding the nature and desired form of the relationship with the country’s neighbor. 

However, both countries’ shared geographical, security, and economic interests make cooperation imperative. The Syrian government continues to assert that Lebanon cannot sustain its policy of self-distancing, declared by the Lebanese government in 2011 with the outbreak of the Syrian crisis. The official Syrian position holds that the post-war phase should open the door to an equitable relationship, built on shared interests and on security and political coordination between the two neighboring states facing common existential challenges in a volatile regional environment. 

However, this position clashes with the legacy of the Syrian war and the sharp divisions it wrought in Lebanon, along with social shocks on both sides. Hezbollah’s extensive, direct military participation in the Syrian war from 2013 onwards, in support of the Assad regime, constituted a critical turning point in Syrian perceptions of Lebanon, especially given the accompanying divisions among the Lebanese themselves, split between a pro-Assad axis and an axis supporting the Syrian opposition. These tensions were compounded by the resulting influx of millions of Syrian refugees into Lebanon’s territory.  

These dynamics created a highly complex situation where each side carries a memory of pain and fear toward the other. Both are now facing the challenge of overcoming this memory to meet the demands of the current situation, and build channels of communication, and address historical and societal rifts. 

Security Challenges in a Multi-Layered Regional Environment 

While the economy represents the primary driver of the current rapprochement, security remains the foundation for both sides as they set out to shape the future of their relationship. Syrian-Lebanese ties have always revolved around security above all else, due to their shared 375-kilometer border, which has never been stable.  

As a result of the tense, complex regional landscape, partially linked to the structure and scale of the foreign military presence on Syrian and Lebanese soil, managing border security has become more complex than ever. Four critical, highly sensitive and interconnected issues pose many of the security challenges in this regard: 

1. The Activities of Organized, Cross-Border Smuggling Networks: These networks siphon off vital commodities such as fuel, weapons, and food, costing the Lebanese treasury hundreds of millions of dollars a year due to the smuggling of commodities through illegal crossings. This inflicts severe damage on the economies of both countries. 
2. Captagon and Human Trafficking: The illicit Captagon trade has transformed into a cross-border industry with enormous parallel economic dimensions, posing a security and political dilemma that strains both Lebanon and Syria’s foreign relations. The significant regional and global impacts of these cross-border networks have been extensively documented. 
3. The Lack of a Complete, Definitive Border Demarcation: This issue has long been neglected in relations between the two countries despite its geostrategic importance, particularly in the Shebaa Farms area, northeastern Lebanon (the Deir al-Ashayer and Tufail regions), and the mouth of the Nahr al-Kabir al-Janoubi river. For decades, Syria refused to initiate a joint demarcation process, citing the circumstances of the occupation of the Golan Heights and overlapping territorial claims. This has created persistent legal and security loopholes, which have been exploited by non-state actors to exert their own influence. Ongoing disarray at the border has meant that swathes of land remain beyond the control of either state. Furthermore, any security-focused approach to the Syrian-Lebanese relationship is no longer possible without taking Israel into account as a central factor.  
4. Hezbollah’s Arsenal and Regional Position: Hezbollah’s arms stand out as one of the most sensitive and complex issues in Syrian-Lebanese bilateral relations, even though both governments avoid raising the issue openly and directly in official meetings, to avoid derailing talks. Hezbollah is not merely a domestic Lebanese actor; it is a fundamental pillar in a regional security calculus that extends across official political borders, linking Lebanon to Syria and Iran through its tight strategic and military alliance with Tehran. The continued existence of parallel military forces outside the framework of legitimate institutions hinders any serious attempt to build an independent national defense policy. 

Political Economy and Vital Mutual Interests 

Despite the entrenched political and security concerns between Beirut and Damascus, the economy remains the most realistic and pressing driver for rapprochement and negotiations, especially given Lebanon’s financial and economic crisis, and Syria’s dire need for post-war reconstruction and an end to the economic isolation imposed on it by Western sanctions, notably the 2019 Caesar Act. 

Syria constitutes Lebanon’s only terrestrial gateway to vital Arab markets, via the Naseeb/Jaber border crossing. Therefore, reactivating land transit traffic and reducing exorbitant customs duties are top economic priorities for Beirut. Syria also needs access to Lebanon’s ports in Beirut and Tripoli as well as access to Lebanon’s banking and commercial expertise to revitalize its economy, particularly as the Syrian banking system continues to suffer greatly from the fallout of the freezing of Syrian assets in Lebanese banks, valued at between $20 billion and $42 billion. These funds have become part of a shared Lebanese-Syrian financial crisis, leading to the expansion of the informal economy and the smuggling network in both countries. 

In this context, the energy sector stands out as a key area for potential cooperation, whether through gas and electricity transmission projects or the revival of regional connectivity projects long disrupted by war and sanctions. Lebanon, mired in a chronic electricity crisis that has spawned a parallel economy of private generators, understands that any long-term solution may partially arrive via Syria, whether through the transfer of Egyptian gas or a partnership to import Jordanian electricity via the Syrian transmission network (which would necessitate repairing the Khirbet Ghazaleh substation to the east of Daraa). This would require complex political and economic agreements to circumvent the sanctions that are currently blocking these projects. 

Likewise, the reconstruction of Syria, which will likely cost hundreds of billions of dollars, could represent a historic economic opportunity for Lebanon, whether through its services sector, its banks, or its regionally renowned contracting and engineering expertise. However, these prospects are currently hampered by partial Western sanctions that still hang over Damascus, international uncertainty over the course of Syria’s transition, and the absence of a clear, shared Syrian-Lebanese economic vision to translate theoretical opportunities into concrete, viable projects. 

Syrian Refugees and the Demographic Dilemma 

The issue of Syrian refugees in Lebanon remains one of the most complex and serious bilateral challenges. Lebanon, a small country that hosts one of the highest per capita refugee densities in the world, faces various challenges. According to official data, between 1.5 and 2 million Syrian refugees are based in Lebanon, of whom only around 800,000 are officially registered with the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR. 

This large presence, which has not been managed with a comprehensive, durable strategy, is imposing enormous economic, social, and security costs that could exceed Lebanon’s capacity. Therefore, the core of this intractable dilemma lies in the potential for the refugee issue to transform from a purely humanitarian and ethical question into a multifaceted political and strategic tool for various sides to apply pressure in multiple ways within regional and international conflicts. 

 In Lebanon, the refugee issue could be weaponized for domestic populist political mobilization, and as a means to deflect attention from the government’s failure to manage successive economic and financial crises. Externally, Beirut might attempt to leverage its hosting of refugees and the associated burdens as a bargaining chip in its relations with the international community and the European Union to secure financial support, while constantly warning of large-scale waves of illegal migration towards European shores.  

On another level, Damascus may seek to employ the refugee issue as a central bargaining chip in its ongoing negotiations with Western and Arab states. The issue of safe return and security facilitations (such as amnesty decrees) is also linked to the lifting of economic sanctions on Syria, access to reconstruction funds, and the opening of channels for full diplomatic normalization. 

Managing the Status Quo 

It is fair to say that despite the positive optics of high-level visits and diplomatic exchanges between Beirut and Damascus, their bilateral relations remain in limbo, governed by a tension between pressing, mutual needs and chronic, historical fear. This structural contradiction can be seen through three main dimensions.  

The first is the geographical and historical dimension, which demands bilateral cooperation and coordination in order to head off crises, even as a political memory burdened by past abuses hinders the development of genuine societal and political trust. The second dimension is the economic and political one, marked by the drive to transform financial collapse into market liberalization and integration even as political anxieties act as brakes to long-term strategic planning. The third dimension is that of security and sovereignty, which calls for border controls through joint efforts to combat terrorism and smuggling, even as concerns about sovereignty in Lebanon warn against a return to an era of hegemony and the loss of independent decision-making. 

It is also essential to consider this bilateral relationship’s interconnectedness through regional and international dynamics. Decisions on Syrian-Lebanese relations are not purely domestic, but are instead subject to major settlements and conflicts in the Middle East, specifically: the trajectory and repercussions of regional confrontations; security arrangements in southern Lebanon and adherence to the UN Security Council Resolution 1701 that mandated the end of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel; the size and nature of the international military presence in Syria; and the position of Damascus within the framework of Arab normalization and international energy and trade corridors. Consequently, long-term stability in relations remains contingent upon reducing the reliance of major powers on the two countries as proxies for pursuing and settling broader strategic rivalries. 

Conclusion 

Advancing a new roadmap requires moving beyond day-to-day crisis management toward the development of functional states, effective institutions, and equal legal sovereignty. This transition cannot be accomplished through protocol visits alone. It requires decisive steps focused on five strategic tracks: the completion of the full legal demarcation of the Syrian-Lebanese border; the equitable deployment of regular military forces; the activation of observation towers to put an end to smuggling networks; the institutionalization of security coordination, particularly by restricting military and intelligence communication channels to the official and legitimate institutions of both states (their armies and official agencies), in order to reduce the influence of parallel cross-border networks; and the strengthening of transparent economic relations, by reviewing previous agreements and adopting fair regulatory frameworks that connect ports and airports to modern transportation networks, thus eliminating the influence of shadow economies.  

This transition will also require regulation of the refugee situation through a clear mechanism for gradual and safe returns, in direct coordination with international agencies, including the UNHCR, and an end to the exploitation of this humanitarian issue as a tool for political pressure. Furthermore, it would demand a unified strategic stance, through coordinated diplomatic positions, as a preventative measure to protect both countries from becoming theaters for proxy wars serving foreign agendas. The window of opportunity that is currently available to Beirut and Damascus, due to the redrawing of spheres of influence and economic corridors in the Levant, may not remain open for long. Seizing this moment wisely and pragmatically, and prioritizing the logic of statehood and sovereignty, may represent the last chance to build healthy and robust relations before the violent geopolitical landscape reproduces the same impasse, conflict, and dependency.