A Region in Flux: Shifting Strategic Alignments in the Middle East

The U.S.-Israel-Iran war has heightened regional volatility, forcing a reassessment of security, sovereignty, and survival calculations across a transforming neighborhood. In response, regional powers are diversifying their alliances and exploring new mechanisms that could support the emergence of robust regional frameworks. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt are emerging as potentially critical players in these efforts, evidenced by growing engagement with regional powers across both bilateral and multilateral platforms. Shared unease over prolonged instability and the perceived limits of external security guarantees will likely remain a defining feature of the Middle East’s evolving alignment strategies. But internal tensions and competing visions may undermine ambitions for a cohesive, shared regional security architecture, challenges that will only deepen amid uncertainties over how the post-war order ultimately takes shape.

Against this backdrop, the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) convened a panel of experts to examine the realignments shaping the region today. Panelists explored a number of key questions including what are the key dynamics driving regional powers’ diversification strategies? Which powers are emerging as the most consequential in these efforts? How are smaller regional states navigating this competitive landscape? And will regional blocs be able to reconcile their divergences and establish robust, comprehensive, and cooperative frameworks?

Albert Wolf 

• Pakistan-Gulf engagement rests on three main pillar: economics resting on the remittances sent by 9 million Pakistanis working in the Gulf, transactional national security relationship through mutual defense pacts, and identity; which the Iran-US/Israel war has touched upon. 

• The cost of stepping back for Pakistan is high; the Iranian attacks have taken the lives of Pakistani nationals in UAE and the obliging defense pact with Riyadh, Pakistan has taken a route out of direct engagement with the aggressions through presenting itself as neutral mediator while bidding the chips for Saudi Arabia. 

• The possibility that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz reveals a level of vulnerability unseen in previous crises, especially given that Iran is no longer a major power and reportedly could not even identify the locations of its own mines. 

• The Abraham Accords have sustained and been strengthened, at least on the the UAE side, showcasing the ever-present reliance of some Gulf actors on the US security patronage. 

Faisal Abbas 

• The current rationale is that; a no deal is better than a bad deal. The negotiating parties are prioritizing long-term stability and peace over rushed deals that could leave the region further vulnerable to Iranian aggression outbursts. 

• The current conflict is not only a conflict limited to the region but its effects in terms of oil and energy prices are felt and are expected to be felt globally. 

• The war has proven the cooperation aspects of the GCC as an organization. The opening of a makeshift airspace in Saudi for the Gulf and neighboring countries to use shows the growing cooperative willingness on the side of all GCC members. 

• At a very expensive cost in terms of reputation and second-guessing, efforts have been made to avoid turning this war into a Sunni-Shia or Persian-Arab conflict; trying to avoid this war not only for their sake but for the sake of the world since it has the potential to ignite succeeding wars. 

• Turkey and Pakistan’s relationship is more strategic rather than transactional. 

• The war has proven that might does not make right, Gulf investments were not vanity and self-interest but necessities. 

Ozge Genc 

• The rapprochement between Turkey and the Gulf states is both a strategic convergence and recalibration, done under the dangerous environment and pressure of post October 7th regionalization of war and the preceding wars including the war on Iran. 

• The drive for the strategic shift has been mainly over three reasons: economic interdependence between Gulf and Turkey, security diversification and crisis containment. 

• Turkey is a regional actor with direct involvement in the Western security architecture as a NATO member, increasing its weight in the mediation talks and making Ankara harder to ignore in regional conflicts. Turkey’s value for the Gulf states for a post-war scenario is not only in its ability to speak the language of the region but also its multi-alliance ability to connect the region to the Euro-Atlantic security debates. 

• The uniqueness of this moment is in that it showcases the regional and adjacent powers want for more agency over regional outcomes; sought through economic and political means, creating the responsibility and opportunities to contribute to this growing regional initiative. 

Faisal Almudahka 

• The entire region is reshaping and recalibrating, be it in the political and economic or security alliances being formed. 

• The current GCC, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan alliances may be based on security for now but hold further cooperation in the future in other sectors; having shared the suffering of episodes of regional war and shared vision of what they want the future to hold. 

• Public opinion has been against the war on Iran, with the GCC public seeing the start of hostilities by the US without being consulted as disappointing and putting the GCC in the middle of the war without their consent. 

• The ripple effects of the war is felt all the way to Italy and India; highlighting the integrated economic vulnerability of nations that rely on Gulf energy. 

• Activation of the Palestinian peace process once again will put a stop to President Trump’s appetite for destruction and disruption, putting an end to the illegitimate claims of aid and misuse of the cause for proxy security satellites.