Operation Rising Lion and the Gulf’s Balancing Act

July 16, 2025

Wednesday, July 16, 2025
4:00 pm GMT - 5:15 pm GMT
Zoom Platform

Summary

In mid‑June 2025, Israel launched “Operation Rising Lion,” a coordinated strike targeting Iranian nuclear and military facilities, citing imminent threats from Tehran’s advancing nuclear program. This marked a dramatic escalation in the Iran–Israel shadow war, igniting a brief but intense regional conflict. Iran responded with missile barrages on Israeli cities, while Israel continued its assault. As the confrontation deepened, the U.S. entered the conflict in support of Israel, striking key Iranian nuclear facilities in “Operation Midnight Hammer.” In response, Iran launched a missile attack on the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, exposing the vulnerability of American assets in the Gulf. As fears of broader war intensified, Qatar, leveraging its diplomatic ties with both Washington and Tehran, played a key mediating role, leading to a U.S.-brokered ceasefire that brought the 12-day confrontation to a pause. Together, these events have raised questions on military vulnerability, deterrence, and the evolving regional security landscape especially for gulf states.

In this context, the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) hosted a webinar to assess the fallout of the Iran-Israel confrontation and its broader implications. Panelists explored key questions, including: What does the Iranian strike on Al Udeid signal about shifting threat perceptions and the credibility of U.S. security guarantees? How are Gulf states recalibrating their military and diplomatic strategies in response to new risks, including proxy activity from groups like the Houthis? How did Qatar navigate its delicate role as both host to CENTCOM and a trusted interlocutor with Tehran? What does this crisis reveal about the future of Iran’s nuclear file, and what paths lie ahead for a more permanent ceasefire or the revival of a nuclear deal? What political, strategic, and regional challenges stand in the way of such efforts?

Rashid Al Mohannadi – Middle East Council  

  • Iran’s assault on Qatar constituted a calculated military operation, as opposed to symbolic posturing. Iran fired 19 missiles, likely their peak capacity, indicating Iran’s operational ability and intent behind the attack. Importantly, the one missile that successfully reached its target struck a significant asset within Al-Udeid base, indicating Iran’s awareness of the base’s strategic infrastructure.    
  • Gulf security will depend on three key elements: the Gulf security vision, the Peninsula Shield Navy, and the Gulf Defense Pact. Yet these alone are insufficient, given the destabilizing roles of both Iran and Israel. 
  • A more sustainable solution lies in building a Gulf-centered security architecture, underpinned by credible defense capabilities and deeper integration among Gulf states. 
  • The Gulf can strengthen existing structures like the Peninsula Shield, with defense officials viewing the war as a catalyst for deeper GCC integration within the next two years. 

Dania Thafer – Gulf International Forum, Middle East Council  

  • The U.S. and Gulf partnerships have survived the war but require strengthening particularly in defense and diplomacy. Looking ahead, Washington is expected to prioritize Israel’s security, even at the expense of Gulf interests. In response, the GCC is likely to press for greater inclusion in discussions on Iran and to expand its diplomatic initiatives aimed at mitigating risks to regional stability posed by U.S. policies.  
  • Iran’s strike on Qatar served more as a face-saving gesture than a genuine effort to destabilize the state. The U.S. avoided escalation by limiting its response, including not launching strikes from the Gulf, yet Gulf states remain discontent with American policy. Looking ahead, the GCC is likely to pursue a more integrated defense framework and enhanced cohesion in response to emerging threats. 
  • Israel retains a privileged position within U.S. policy, yet diverges ideologically from Washington when it comes to the question of war. The Gulf may be able to exploit this divide to enhance its influence in regional diplomacy.   
  • To manage Iran, the Gulf relies on engagement, unity, and deterrence, but must also build self-reliance and assertive, cohesive diplomacy. 
  • The war demonstrated that Iran prioritizes regime survival over Gulf security. At the same time, Israel’s postwar conduct has eroded future prospects for engagement or normalization with its neighbors.  

 

Mahjoob Zweiri – Qatar University, Middle East Council  

  • October 7th and its aftermath has created greater trepidation for Arabs, Iranians, and Turks while triggering a series of Israeli-led wars against neighboring states. This has redefined Israel’s role in the region and its ties with Arab states and Iran. According to Zweiri, Israel justifies its use of military force by presenting itself as a global “victim.” 
  • The war underscored three sources of instability: deep distrust between Israel and Iran, Israel’s pursuit of regime change, and Iran’s military reach that threatens Gulf states. Iran’s strike on Al-Udeid aimed to deter U.S. involvement by warning of risks to bilateral ties, but Washington viewed this as a miscalculation, since losing Qatar is not in Iran’s interest.  
  • Israel’s maneuvers continue to reshape the region, with Gulf states caught in the middle of shifting regional dynamics. 
  • Iran’s broad network of connections via the Gulf enhances its sense of security and adaptability, while the Gulf states’ divergent regional positions provide Tehran opportunities to cultivate support and vilify Israel. 

 

Additional – Q&A  

  • The conversation in the Q&A highlights concerns over escalating tensions in Gaza and its surroundings, criticizing Israel’s failure to de-escalate and urging a stronger U.S. to avert future instability.  Europe’s initiatives were deemed insufficient, underscoring the need for closer alignment with American policy. 
  • The “Axis of Resistance” has diminished influence in Iraq and Yemen following the Saudi-Houthi ceasefire. Threats persist between Iran and GCC countries.   
  • Netanyahu’s erratic conduct has been compared to the U.S. post-9/11 strategy of vilifying adversaries, raising concern.  
  • Although U.S. military planning demonstrates adaptability by reallocating resources toward perceived threats, such as military action in the South China Sea, significant strategic change is improbable without political agreements among leading powers to constrain Israel’s actions. 
  • In general, the group perceives little immediate transformation unless wider diplomatic actions take place. 

 

 

Moderator

Speakers

Nonresident Fellow
Nonresident Senior Fellow
Nonresident Senior Fellow