



Ten Years After the Paris Agreement: Outcomes, Implications, and Strategic Pathways for the Gulf

Neeshad Shafi

KEYWORDS

Climate change, COP, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Climate Finance, Carbon Tax



Copyright © 2026 The Middle East Council on Global Affairs

The Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) is an independent, non-profit policy research institution based in Doha, Qatar. The ME Council gratefully acknowledges the financial support of its donors, who value the independence of its scholarship. The analysis and policy recommendations presented in this and other ME Council publications are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the organization, its management, its donors, or its other scholars and affiliates.

Cover Image caption

A man walks past national flags of participating countries at the venue of the COP28 United Nations climate summit in Dubai on November 30, 2023. (Photo by Karim SAHIB / AFP)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Ten years after the Paris Agreement, climate diplomacy shifts from ambition-setting to delivery pressures:

While successive COPs have expanded participation, transparency, and financing, the persistent gap between commitments and implementation has placed pressure on presenting measurable outcomes.

COP30 marks a shift from norm-setting to implementation credibility:

COP30 in Belém prioritized delivery of climate finance, adaptation metrics, and accountability mechanisms over new mitigation pledges, signaling a transition from negotiating ambition to demonstrating practical implementation.

Trade-linked climate regulation may shape Gulf economic exposure more than multilateral negotiations:

Emerging sustainability standards, carbon border measures, and sectoral compliance regimes are likely to exert more immediate influence on market access and competitiveness than formal COP outcomes.

Qatar's updated NDC reflects growing alignment with evolving climate governance expectations:

The 2025 submission emphasizes stronger transparency, broader sectoral coverage, and enhanced monitoring frameworks, indicating a gradual shift toward implementation credibility and international comparability.

Introduction: A Decade After Paris

The Paris Agreement, adopted at COP21 in 2015, represented a paradigm shift in international climate governance.¹ Departing from the topdown architecture of earlier regimes, Paris introduced a flexible framework centered on non-binding action plans, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs),² transparency mechanisms, and periodic global stocktakes. This design enabled unprecedented participation and political buyin, but it also placed primary responsibility for ambition and implementation on national governments operating within diverse political and economic contexts.

COP21 and COP30, a decade apart, demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. While nearly all parties to the agreement have submitted NDCs and engaged with the transparency framework,³ global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to rise,⁴ and the pace of structural transformation has lagged behind scientific imperatives.⁵ Climate impacts, particularly extreme heat, drought, flooding, and sealevel rise have intensified,⁶ underscoring the urgency of adaptation alongside mitigation.

In November 2025, COP30 took place at a moment when the central challenge was no longer normsetting, but credibility. COP30 also provided updates on the first-ever Global Stocktake, which delivered a sobering assessment of collective progress,⁷ highlighting ambitions in mitigation, adaptation planning, and financial support. COP30 was therefore expected to respond not with abstract commitments, but with tangible pathways to implementation amid political uncertainty and the looming prospect of US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (which took place shortly after US president Donald Trump took office).⁸ For Gulf countries, evolving geopolitical uncertainty and uneven global climate engagement underscore the importance of sustained diplomatic participation and proactive climate positioning to safeguard economic competitiveness, policy credibility, and long-term transition planning.⁹

For Gulf countries, evolving geopolitical uncertainty and uneven global climate engagement underscore the importance of sustained diplomatic participation and proactive climate positioning to safeguard economic competitiveness.

For the Gulf countries, this tenyear milestone is particularly salient. Countries in the Gulf have increasingly engaged in climate diplomacy over the past decade and beyond, hosting major conferences, including COP18 in Doha and the recently held COP28 in Dubai, which have led to increased investment in clean energy and the development of national climate strategies. COP30 offered an opportunity to assess how global climate governance is evolving and what this evolution implies for resourcedependent economies navigating a complex transition.



This policy brief provides an analysis of the past decade since COP21, the outcomes of COP30, and their implications for Gulf countries. It reviews key outcomes of the negotiation and decisionmaking and their regional implications and also offers a brief analysis of Qatar's updated ambitious NDC submitted in November 2025.

Key Outcomes of COP30

What's New at COP30 Agendas: From COP28 to COP30

The progression from COP28 to COP30 reflects a gradual shift from political signaling toward implementation-focused climate governance. COP28 placed strong emphasis on the Global Stocktake,¹⁰ climate finance mobilization, and more explicit discussion around transitioning away from fossil fuels, expanding the political scope of climate diplomacy. COP29 focused more on operational follow-through, advancing technical discussions on finance delivery,¹¹ transparency frameworks, and mitigation pathways, with outcomes largely consolidating existing commitments rather than introducing major new agreements.

As for COP30, the agenda moved further toward implementation credibility, prioritizing climate finance delivery, adaptation metrics, and accountability mechanisms over new mitigation pledges.¹² This evolution suggests a broader transition from negotiation-centered climate diplomacy toward implementation, regulatory alignment, and practical policy delivery. This shift reflects growing recognition among parties that credibility in the post-Paris climate regime increasingly depends on demonstrable implementation rather than the articulation of additional pledges.

At this year's COP30 in Belem, Brazil, negotiators emphasized on the operational transparency, adaptation outcomes, and climate finance flows, which would ultimately strengthen accountability within the global climate framework. At the same time, the discussion expanded to address the facilitating implementation, including regulatory coherence, investment mobilization, technology transfer, and institutional capacity-building. These key developments indicated that climate governance is moving beyond formal negotiation settings, with trade policy, financial regulation, corporate disclosure requirements, and market-based climate mechanisms playing an increasingly influential role in shaping climate action. These developments will lead future COP negotiations to focus more on implementation architecture, policy coordination, and practical delivery mechanisms than new headline commitments alone.

In 2025, COP30 took place amid a broader geopolitical realignment in the US and other Western countries, prompting them to step back from their traditional leadership roles. Following the COP30, on January 27, 2026, the United States officially withdrew from the Paris Agreement for the second time. This led to a leadership vacuum that is increasingly being filled by actors such as the European Union (EU) and China,¹³ both of which are strongly committed to energy transition, climate finance and investment, and multilateral climate cooperation.¹⁴ For Gulf states, this evolving international climate space presents a strategic opportunity, where their financial capacity, increasing clean energy investments, and strong diplomatic engagement position them to play a more significant role in mobilizing climate finance, fostering global and regional cooperation, and advancing the energy transition, thereby strengthening economic competitiveness and international climate credibility.

Climate Finance: Commitments without Action

Climate finance has always remained a key point of discussion at COPs, also at COP30 negotiations. Parties endorsed significantly higher political targets for mobilizing finance toward 2035, with particular emphasis on increasing adaptation funding.¹⁵ This shift reflects growing recognition that mitigation-centric finance flows have failed to address the immediate needs of climate-vulnerable countries. The finance outcomes of COP30 represent an incremental advance rather than a structural breakthrough. While headline announcements signal political will, the absence of binding commitments, clearer burdensharing arrangements, and robust accountability mechanisms limits their operational on-ground impact. Moreover, the continued reliance on leveraged private finance raises concerns regarding accessibility, conditionality, and debt sustainability for recipient countries.¹⁶

For Gulf states, climate finance also presents strategic policy levers beyond traditional donor-recipient dynamics. These countries' huge sovereign wealth funds, developmental finance institutions, and regionally anchored investment platforms could support blended finance facilities, sovereign-backed guarantees, and regional adaptation funds targeting the Middle East and North Africa's (MENA) resilience priorities. Qatar, in particular, could leverage institutions such as its development finance entities and investment vehicles to catalyze climate-aligned infrastructure, carbon market participation,¹⁷ and adaptation financing, positioning itself as both a regional convener and financial intermediary.

The finance outcomes of COP30 represent an incremental advance rather than a structural breakthrough. While headline announcements signal political will, the absence of binding commitments, clearer burden sharing arrangements, and robust accountability mechanisms limits their operational on-ground impact.

Thus, climate finance occupies a dual opportunity for the Gulf countries. As developing countries under the UNFCCC, they are not formally obligated to provide finance, since these countries' economic capacity and global and regional influence increasingly position them as potential contributors and conveners of climate finance initiatives, particularly within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This emphasis on COP30 outcomes reinforces expectations that wealthier economies will be playing a more visible and significant role in shaping future finance architectures.

Adaptation Governance and Metrics

Another key area of progress at COP30 was the advancement of adaptation governance. The discussion on the common adaptation indicators signifies an effort to address the challenges of measuring, comparing, and financing adaptation outcomes. Both mitigation and adaptation have historically lacked clearer metrics, which has complicated both policy evaluation and resource allocation.

The elevation of adaptation within the COP30 agenda is particularly relevant for regions already experiencing severe climate impacts. By institutionalizing adaptation indicators and strengthening links to national adaptation plans, COP30 contributes to a more balanced understanding of climate action, one that recognizes resilience and risk management as core components of sustainable development.

For Qatar and its Gulf neighbors, adaptation governance is not a peripheral concern. Extreme heat, water scarcity, and coastal exposure pose material risks to public health, infrastructure, and economic productivity.

For Qatar and its Gulf neighbors, adaptation governance is not a peripheral concern. Extreme heat, water scarcity, and coastal exposure pose material risks to public health, infrastructure, and economic productivity.¹⁸ COP30's adaptation outcomes provide reference points for aligning national resilience strategies with emerging international best practices.

Just Transition Discourse

COP30 also advanced the discourse on just transition, emphasizing the social and economic dimensions of climate policy.¹⁹ While the resulting frameworks remain largely aspirational, their inclusion reflects growing awareness that climate action cannot be divorced from employment, social equity, and development considerations.²⁰ For hydrocarbon-dependent economies, just transition narratives are particularly sensitive. It raises key questions on economic diversification, works force reskilling and social contracts. The discussion at COP30 did not resolve these tensions, but it did provide a platform for more engagement with the tradeoffs inherent in structural transformation.

Mitigation and the Fossil Fuel Bottleneck

The most politically contentious aspect of COP30 was the failure to agree on explicit language -on the phaseout or phase-down of fossil fuels. Despite strong advocacy from a coalition of countries and civil society actors, opposition and obfuscation from major producer states including the host country, Brazil, prevented consensus.²¹

This outcome underscores the structural limits of multilateral climate negotiations when core economic interests are at stake. It also highlights the reality that, while global decarbonization is widely acknowledged as necessary, pathways remain deeply contested. For Qatar and other Gulf producers, this impasse provides shortterm flexibility but does not negate longerterm pressures arising from technological change, market dynamics, and evolving regulatory regimes.

COP30 Implications for the Gulf Region

Political Economy of Climate Action in Hydrocarbon-Exporting States

The implications of COP30 for the Gulf region must be understood through the lens of political economy. The Gulf states, which constitute the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), are amongst the world's highest per-capita emitters, major suppliers of global energy, and highly exposed to climate risks. This structural position creates a distinctive set of incentives and constraints that shape engagement with international climate governance.

One of the significant issues at COP30 was the failure to agree on explicit fossil fuel phase-out language, which preserves a degree of strategic autonomy for hydrocarbon-exporting states. In the short term, this outcome reduces the risk of abrupt policy shocks emanating from the multilateral process. However, it would be deceptive to interpret this as an endorsement of the status quo. Rather, it reflects the limits of consensus-based negotiation in addressing deeply embedded development models.

For the Gulf countries' economies, the political economy challenge and opportunity lies in managing a steady but credible transition while maintaining fiscal stability and social cohesion. COP30 in Belem reinforced the importance of country-led transition strategies that emphasize diversification, climate investment in low-carbon technologies, and the strategic use of hydrocarbon revenues to finance future economic transformation.

Economic Diversification, Trade, and Climate Risk

The global climate transition is increasingly intersecting with trade and industrial policy.²² Climate-related trade measures, including carbon pricing regimes, carbon border adjustments (CBAM),²³ sustainable finance taxonomies, and climate disclosure standards, are reshaping competitiveness dynamics and are likely to intensify in the coming decade. The discussion and negotiations at COP30 did not directly address these issues; its broader emphasis on implementation signals a tightening global climate policy environment.

For the Gulf states, this trend presents both risks and opportunities. Continued reliance on carbon-intensive exports may expose economies to demand volatility and regulatory barriers. At the same time, substantial capital positions Gulf states to invest in emerging sectors such as hydrogen, advanced materials, carbon capture and storage, and climate-resilient infrastructure. Targeted investments in climate technology, participation in carbon markets, and adaptation initiatives offer Gulf countries practical pathways to manage regulatory exposure while sustaining economic competitiveness during the energy transition.

Adaptation and Resilience as Strategic Imperatives

Adaptation is of particular strategic importance to the Gulf region. The region's historic but rising temperatures, frequent extreme heat events, water scarcity, and coastal vulnerability pose direct risks to the economy, public health, and infrastructure. COP30's emphasis on adaptation

indicators and national adaptation planning aligns closely with these regional realities. For countries like Qatar, integrating adaptation into national development planning is essential not only for risk management but also for long-term economic sustainability. Increased investments in climate-resilient urban infrastructure, water security, and public health systems should be understood as key components of national resilience.

Qatar's Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0)

Evolution of Qatar's Climate Commitments

Qatar's updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0), submitted in November 2025,²⁴ represents an evolution in the country's approach to climate policy. Earlier iterations of Qatar's NDC relied heavily on relative reductions against business-as-usual projections. The new ambitious commitment moves toward clearer quantification, expanded sectoral coverage, and strengthened alignment with international transparency frameworks. This evolution reflects both external and internal drivers. Internationally, the Paris Agreement's emphasis on progression and transparency has increased scrutiny of NDC credibility. Domestically, growing awareness of climate risks and economic diversification imperatives has elevated climate policy within national planning processes.²⁵

Mitigation Scope and Sectoral Coverage

The updated NDC outlines mitigation measures across key sectors, including energy production, industry, transport, waste, and agriculture. The emphasis on reducing emissions intensity in the oil and gas sector reflects Qatar's recognition of the centrality of this sector to its emissions profile. From an analytical perspective, the sectoral breadth of the NDC is a notable strength. However, the extended time horizon and limited specificity regarding policy instruments raise questions about near-term impact. As global attention increasingly focuses on 2030 milestones, the credibility of long-term targets will depend on the articulation of concrete implementation pathways.

MRV, Transparency and Institutional Capacity

A strong component of Qatar's new NDC is the emphasis on monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV). A strengthened MRV system is essential for both domestic policy coordination and international credibility. This aligns COP30's focus on implementation and accountability, underscoring the importance of such systems in the evolving climate regime. For Qatar, robust MRV frameworks can also support participation in international carbon markets and climate finance mechanisms. Institutional capacity-building in this area should therefore be viewed as a strategic investment rather than a compliance exercise.

Adaptation and Co-Benefits

Alongside, key updates also on Adaptation, but mitigation remains the central focus of Qatar's NDC, adaptation considerations are increasingly visible. Given the country's exposure to climate risks, deeper integration of adaptation into the NDC framework would strengthen coherence between international commitments and domestic resilience planning.

Looking Ahead: COP31 in Türkiye and Beyond

While COP30 maintained momentum in multilateral climate diplomacy, future pressure on hydrocarbon-exporting economies is likely to emerge outside of the UNFCCC negotiation process as well. Trade measures such as carbon border adjustments, sustainability disclosure requirements, financial risk pricing, climate litigation, and evolving ESG norms may exert stronger influence on investment flows and market access than negotiated treaty language.²⁶ For Qatar and other Gulf states, this suggests that climate strategy must integrate trade, finance, technology, and diplomatic considerations alongside traditional climate policy. Preparing for COP31 in Türkiye and subsequent negotiation cycles will therefore require proactive engagement not only within the UNFCCC framework but also across emerging regulatory and financial arenas shaping the global energy transition.

While COP30 maintained momentum in multilateral climate diplomacy, future pressure on hydrocarbon-exporting economies is likely to emerge outside of the UNFCCC negotiation process as well.

Strategic Pathways and Policy Implications for Qatar

From Commitments to Implementation

COP30 reinforces a central lesson of the post-Paris era: the credibility of climate action increasingly rests on implementation rather than ambition alone. For Qatar, this implies strengthening policy coherence across ministries, aligning climate objectives with economic planning, and ensuring that NDC targets are supported by enforceable domestic measures.²⁷

Leveraging Carbon Markets and Finance

International carbon markets and climate finance mechanisms offer potential avenues for mobilizing investment and technology transfer. Participating in market-based mechanisms, Qatar should be guided by rigorous standards, transparency, and alignment with national development priorities.

International and Regional Engagement

Qatar's strategic positioning as a regional and international convenor can be leveraged to advance constructive climate dialogue. This includes strengthening and facilitating regional cooperation on adaptation, supporting knowledge-sharing, and contributing to reform discussions on global climate finance architecture.

Strategic Considerations for Qatar

COP30 in Belem reinforced the need for an integrated approach to climate policy that aligns mitigation, adaptation, and economic diversification. For Qatar, key considerations should include further strengthening implementation frameworks domestically, embedding climate risk into national economic planning, and leveraging international market-based mechanisms such as carbon markets and climate financing. Equally important is the role of diplomacy. As global climate governance enters a more contested phase, Qatar's ability to act as a constructive intermediary, bridging Global North and South perspectives, and producer and consumer interests, will be a critical asset.

Conclusion

A decade after the Paris Agreement, COP30 underscores both the resilience and the limitations of the global climate negotiations. While progress has been made in finance, adaptation, and discourse, the gap between ambition and implementation remains substantial. For Qatar and the Gulf, the postCOP30 landscape demands strategic clarity, policy coherence, and proactive engagement.

By aligning national climate action with longterm economic transformation and regional leadership, Qatar can navigate the complexities of the climate transition while enhancing its international standing. COP30 does not provide definitive answers, but it clarifies the contours of the challenge and the necessity of decisive action in the decade ahead.

ENDNOTES

1. For more details on the Paris Agreement, please visit: <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement>.
2. “The Paris Agreement and NDCs,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), accessed February 9, 2025, <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs>.
3. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *The Paris Agreement at Ten Years: Expert Views on Progress and Challenges for Climate Change Mitigation* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.1787/c5f214dc-en>.
4. H. Lee and J. Romero (eds.), *Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC* (Geneva: IPCC, 2023), <https://dx.doi.org/10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647>.
5. Lee and Romero (eds.), *Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report*.
6. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), *Adaptation Gap Report 2024: Come Hell and High Water — As Fires and Floods Hit the Poor Hardest, It Is Time for the World to Step Up Adaptation Actions* (Nairobi: UNEP, 2024), <https://doi.org/10.59117/20.500.11822/46497>.
7. “Outcome of the First Global Stocktake,” UNFCCC, accessed February 7, 2026, <https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake/about-the-global-stocktake/outcome-of-the-first-global-stocktake>.
8. UNFCCC, “Step Back from Climate Cooperation Will Hurt US Economy: Statement from UN Climate Chief on US,” press release, January 8, 2026, <https://unfccc.int/news/step-back-from-climate-cooperation-will-hurt-us-economy-statement-from-un-climate-chief-on-us>.
9. Neeshad Shafi, “Trump’s Climate Silence Risks Undermining Gulf Engagement,” *Afkar* (blog, Middle East Council on Global Affairs), September 3, 2025, https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/trumps-climate-silence-risks-undermining-gulf-engagement/.
10. “Global Stocktake,” UNFCCC, accessed February 7, 2026, <https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake>.
11. David Waskow et. al, “COP29 Outcomes: Next Steps,” World Resources Institute, November 27, 2024, <https://www.wri.org/insights/cop29-outcomes-next-steps>.
12. “COP30 Landmark Outcomes Emerge from Negotiations Despite Unprecedented Geopolitical Tensions,” COP30 Brazil Official Website, November 23, 2025, <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/cop30-landmark-outcomes-emerge-from-negotiations-despite-unprecedented-geopolitical-tensions>.
13. European Council and Council of the European Union, “Joint EU-China Press Statement on Climate,” press release, July 24, 2025, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/24/joint-eu-china-press-statement-on-climate/>.
14. United Nations, “Secretary-General Statement on Climate Cooperation,” press release, July 24, 2025, <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sgsm22739.doc.htm>.
15. Josh Gabbatiss, “Analysis: Why COP30’s ‘tripling adaptation finance’ target is less ambitious than it seems,” CarbonBrief, December 3, 2025, <https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-why-cop30s-tripling-adaptation-finance-target-is-less-ambitious-than-it-seems/>.
16. Gabbatiss, “Analysis: Why COP30’s Tripling Adaptation Finance Target Is Less Ambitious Than It Seems.”
17. Neeshad Shafi, “Carbon Markets and Emission Reduction Strategies for Achieving Net-Zero Emissions in the MENA Region,” in *Carbon Emissions Reduction Strategies for Qatar*, eds. Nader Kabbani and Muez Ali, February 20, 2025, https://mecouncil.org/publication_chapters/carbon-markets-and-emission-reduction-strategies-for-achieving-net-zero-emissions-in-the-mena-region/.
18. Abdulla Almheiri, Jorge F. Montenegro, Ewane Basil Ewane, and Midhun Mohan, “Climate change hazards and the resilience of coastal cities in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries: A systematic review,” *City and Environment Interactions* (24), no. 4 (December 2024): <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cacint.2024.100177>.
19. “COP30 Presidency Engages with Civil Society on Just Transition,” COP30 Brazil Official Website, November 11, 2025, <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/cop30-presidency-engages-with-civil-society-on-just-transition>.
20. “Just Transition Towards Environmentally Sustainable Economies,” International Labour Organization (ILO), accessed October 23, 2025, <https://www.ilo.org/topics-and-sectors/just-transition-towards-environmentally-sustainable-economies-and-societies>.
21. Jimena Leiva Roesch and Jonah Harris, “The Path to Transitioning away from Fossil Fuels after COP30,” *IPI Global Observatory*, December 5, 2025, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2025/12/the-path-to-transitioning-away-from-fossil-fuels-after-cop30/>.
22. “Climate-Resilient Development: How Trade and Finance Can Help,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, December 15, 2025, <https://unctad.org/news/climate-resilient-development-how-trade-and-finance-can-help>; Aaron Maltais and Timothy Suljada, *Green industrial policy: challenges and opportunities for a globally inclusive and fair energy transition*, SEI Report (Stockholm Environment Institute, October 2025), <https://doi.org/10.51414/sei2025.047>.
23. “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism,” European Commission, accessed February 7, 2026, https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en.
24. National Planning Council (NPC), *State of Qatar’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): Third Submission (NDC 3.0)*, Periodic Report (Doha: NPC, November 2025) <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2025-11/Qatar%20NDC%203.0.pdf>.
25. Ministry of Environment and Climate Change (MECC), *Qatar National Climate Change Action Plan*, Report (Doha: MECC, September 2021), https://www.mecc.gov.qa/Publications/NCCAP-Consolidated_digital-en_new.pdf.
26. For more information, visit the website of the *Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures*: <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org>.
27. Justin Dargin “Gas Growth and Green Ambitions: Qatar’s Climate Blueprint,” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, May 30, 2025 <https://mecouncil.org/publication/gas-growth-and-green-ambitions-qatars-climate-blueprint/>.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Neeshad Shafi

Neeshad Shafi is a nonresident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs and co-founder of the Arab Youth Climate Movement Qatar (AYCM-Q). He is an award-winning environmentalist with experience analyzing global climate policy, strategy, and advocacy with a focus on the Gulf and Middle East. He is also an expert on social movements and the political dimensions of environmental politics in the Arab region. He was named in the “Apolitical List” of the 100 Most Influential People in Climate Policy in 2019 and 2022. He was also recognized among the ‘Middle East’s Most Creative People in Business’ by Fast Company in 2023 under the ‘Saving the Planet’ category. In 2024, he was listed in the Climate 100 List by The Independent, a UK-based media outlet. Shafi was previously a nonresident fellow with the Wilson Center and Middle East Institute (MEI).

About the Middle East Council on Global Affairs

The Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) is an independent, non-profit policy research institution based in Doha, Qatar. The ME Council produces policy-relevant research, convenes meetings and dialogues, and engages policy actors on geopolitical and socioeconomic issues facing the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The ME Council serves as a bridge between the MENA region and the rest of the world, providing a regional perspective on global policy issues and establishing partnerships with other leading research centers and development organizations across the MENA region and the world.

Middle East Council on Global Affairs

Burj Al Mana 3rd floor, Street 850, Zone 60, Doha, Qatar
www.mecouncil.org