The New Syria: Regional Reintegration and Reconstruction

Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria has moved rapidly toward a new political and regional position under the transitional government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Damascus has reasserted control over areas long held by U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish forces, while the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into state institutions is reportedly in its final stages. At the same time, Syria’s regional and international engagement has expanded, with Arab stakeholders playing an important role in supporting its reintegration and reconstruction, while Washington has moved from cautious observer to active engagement. The Trump administration has lifted sectoral sanctions, suspended core provisions of the Caesar Act, and initiated the rescission of Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, clearing the way for U.S. and foreign investment in the country’s reconstruction. Emerging security talks between Damascus and Israel have also added a new dimension to Syria’s regional trajectory. Yet the transition remains fragile: millions of Syrians still need humanitarian assistance, minority communities continue to raise protection concerns, and questions remain over the pace and durability of political and security integration.

Against this backdrop, the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) hosted an online public panel discussion to examine Syria’s evolving role in the region and the internal and external dynamics shaping its political transition, reconstruction, and reintegration into the regional order. The session addressed key questions, including: What role can Gulf states and other regional actors play in supporting Syria’s reconstruction and reintegration? Can sanctions relief and foreign investment translate into durable stability? How are the United States and other external powers recalibrating their engagement with Damascus, and what impact will this have on Syria’s trajectory? What does the U.S. troop withdrawal mean for Syria and the wider region? How far can Syrian Israeli security talks realistically go, and what would they mean for regional security arrangements? And what political, economic, and security risks could still undermine Syria’s transition and its emerging role in the Middle East?

Ibrahim Al-Assil, Senior Research Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Middle East Initiative

● The people’s assembly of the Syrian parliament is weak by design, due to the constitutional declaration that created it, which placed little power in parliament. Two thirds of the parliament were indirectly chosen by the president, and one third was directly chosen by the president.

● The parliament has not been able to convene yet because it does not have a budget. Incapacity and subordination to the President are both major concerns when assessing the level of democratic development in Syria right now.

● It is too early to definitively say anything, as coalitions and blocs seem to be emerging within the parliament. It is important to pay attention to discussions, political gatherings, and other signs of emerging coalitions.

● The ability of local councils, such as neighborhoods or municipalities, to exercise authority is another key way of measuring democracy. Syrians in different parts of Syria experienced the war differently, and therefore experience transition and recovery differently as well.

● Syria’s recovery requires concentrated effort from the US and other international actors to help Syrians build their own institutions, including parliament and local governments. Assistance should focus on decentralized local councils and municipal authorities, while avoiding lecturing Syrians on democracy.

Reem Turkmani, Assistant Professorial Research Fellow at LSE IDEAS and the LSE Middle East Centre

● State institutions in Syria have an accountability issue, including the new parliament. There is not enough transparency across the system for accountability in general.

● Syria still lacks the legal framework needed to handle its past issues. The crimes committed in Syria were not individual crimes; they were systemic crimes committed at the state level.

● Individuals who have been put behind bars were tried under existing criminal law, which treats them as individuals. Prosecuting war crimes through standard criminal courts also risks being perceived as “victor’s justice,” making a dedicated transitional justice framework necessary.

● The authorities want to consolidate the different fragments and sects within Syria, but they inherited a very fragmented situation geographically, religiously, and economically. The new government’s sectarian background is also alienating to parts of Syria’s population.

● For a country that emerged from a brutal civil war, there has nevertheless been a reasonable degree of security and stability post-conflict.

Marwan Kabalan

● Israel has been the greatest challenge to Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity since the collapse of the Assad regime. The new Syrian government underestimated how significant the Israeli threat is and initially focused mostly on internal affairs.

● The new government’s strategy toward Israel is still problematic, as Israel continues to deal with Syria as though it is a faction rather than a government or sovereign state.

● There is not enough pushback against this in Syria because the government fears it could be ousted like Assad. However, this is partly because it is not reading the regional and international context correctly.

● The United States and Arab countries are interested in a stable Syria, supporting the new government, and keeping Iran out of Syria. Similarly, European countries do not want to see another wave of Syrian refugees.

● The president has emphasized that he does not want loans from the IMF or other international organizations and would rather rely on foreign investment and local resources. Syria also has an opportunity to present itself as an alternative trade and energy corridor, although sanctions and regional security remain challenges.

Natasha Hall

● Improvements in Damascus should not be mistaken for improvements across Syria. There is a narrow window of opportunity to create lasting stability in Syria.

● Over 50 million people within Syria still require humanitarian aid, and one third of the housing stock has been destroyed over the last 14 years of war, despite there already being a housing shortage before the war.

● The government has primarily focused on private sector investments, while the cost of living has continued to rise even with recent pay increases for public sector employees.

● Water and sanitation remain major concerns, as two thirds of Syria’s water treatment plants and half of its pumping stations no longer function. International donors should prioritize emergency water and sanitation rehabilitation to prevent the situation from worsening.

● Although the government is eager for refugees to return, there needs to be a more enabling environment for this to happen. This includes more flexible arrangements, such as allowing people to make go-and-see visits, begin reconstructing their homes, or see how their property has been re-allocated.