The US-China Summit and the Future of the Middle East

President Donald Trump’s recent visit to Beijing, the first by a sitting U.S. president in nearly a decade, took place against the backdrop of escalating tensions in the Gulf and mounting strains in U.S.-China relations. The summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping focused on trade, technology, Taiwan, artificial intelligence, and the ongoing Iran war, underscoring the increasingly interconnected nature of global geopolitical and economic challenges. While both leaders described the visit positively and announced progress on trade and economic cooperation, significant differences remain over strategic competition, export controls, regional security, and the future of global governance.

The ongoing war in the Gulf loomed large over the discussions in Beijing, highlighting the Gulf’s growing strategic importance not only as a vital energy corridor but also as a cornerstone of global trade, shipping, financial systems, and digital infrastructure. Reports suggest that the summit included discussions on maintaining stability in the Strait of Hormuz, preventing further regional escalation, and managing the broader economic fallout from the crisis.

Against this backdrop, the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) convened a panel of experts to examine the outcomes of the Trump-Xi summit and assess their implications for the Middle East. The discussion explored how evolving U.S.-China dynamics could shape the region’s security architecture, economic outlook, technological landscape, and geopolitical positioning amid an increasingly fragmented global order.

Enrico Maria Fardella

• The U.S.-China summit was honest, with the main target being symbolic consolidation and management of an existing dangerous rivalry, an approach not unique to the Trump administration but still important in generating contact and encouraging trade and investment ties.
• Both sides of the meeting are weak, with Trump facing strong domestic and international scrutiny and China facing a serious domestic economic crisis, making this summit a useful arena for generating external stability to address internal issues.
• Trump, even before this meeting, violated one of the 1982 six assurances given to Taiwan during the Reagan administration by discussing Taiwan arms deals with the Beijing leadership.
• The Trump administration is able to speak the language of a transactional, new imperial order, a shift away from previous liberal discourse that appeals to Beijing. Economically, however, the two powers have reached a level of structural incompatibility that prevents improvement in relations, necessitating the rational management of competition.
• The politicization of globalization is a growing concern for middle powers like the GCC. China views the Gulf as an absorber and maintains its external-surplus model as Western markets grow defensive.
• Gulf countries need to address the global dilemma of whether to continue betting on the dollar system or act more flexibly in a growing multipolar framework.

Chuchu Zhang

• China’s biggest concerns regarding the U.S.-Israel-Iran war are the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, disruptions to gas and LNG imports from the region, and a global increase in energy prices.
• China has a non-aligned policy, maintaining a neutral status in Middle Eastern conflicts. Internal divisions within the GCC further reduce the feasibility of China taking sides, and the end of this war does not depend on Chinese involvement.
• China-U.S. ties are direct and more in line with great power interaction, not dependent on external variables. China plays the role of a zero-enemy partner, with no military allies, and its economic concerns lie in ties with both GCC countries rather than exclusively with Iran.
• The commercial hesitation among Chinese business owners to expand into the GCC stems from regional instability and a fragile security situation. Despite this, China has benefited from GCC sovereign funds.
• Chinese energy dependence on oil-producing countries in the Middle East, despite diversification efforts, creates uncertainty about reserves and reliance on single or regional producers, complicating future energy geopolitics.
• While China has been clear on freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, it has also been vocal in the UNSC about legally equalizing freedom of navigation with the rights of coastal states, motivated by the leeway this affords it in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.

Ahmed Aboudouh

• GCC countries have sought to leverage China-GCC relations over Iran-China relations by increasing energy exports. China, however, is unlikely to budge from its position on Iran due to the economic benefits generated by Iranian oil exports to private Chinese companies.
• China is conscious of the UNSC-imposed ban on arms sales to Iran but will continue to provide dual-use technologies and weaponry alongside diplomatic support, further pushing Iran and China closer.
• The current security architecture of the GCC limits Chinese involvement, but as the U.S. approach has been strongly anti-Iran and Russia is weakened by the Ukraine war, China emerges as the only viable global power that could serve as a venue for long-term de-escalation.
• Trump’s overturning of the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule has integrated Gulf states into the U.S. AI ecosystem, making them an extension of Silicon Valley. However, the Gulf countries are not strategically aligned with U.S. AI policy, to the detriment of China.
• While the U.S. leads in foundational AI and infrastructure, and China leads in applications, Gulf states aim to be beneficiaries of both markets, as their Vision 2030 and economic development plans rely on them. The diverging U.S.-China AI race may converge in the future, giving GCC states the ability to hedge and compartmentalize their cooperation with each.
• The U.S.-China and China-Russia meetings both showcase China’s goal of maintaining a cautious, neutral stance with many nations. Russia is far more dependent on Chinese trade than China is on Russia, with Russian trade accounting for only 4% of China’s overall foreign trade, while Chinese trade accounts for 35% of all Russian trade.