Gulf Politics and the Future of US Relations

Gulf states have been steadily adapting to a shifting global and regional order, marked by evolving power dynamics, new economic priorities, and more diversified international partnerships. However, the recent Iran war has significantly accelerated these transformations, exposing vulnerabilities and intensifying strategic recalculations across the region. As Gulf countries faced direct security threats, disruptions to energy flows, and economic uncertainty, they have been pushed to reassess their relationships with global and regional powers, recalibrate their defense strategies, and rethink their economic priorities in an increasingly volatile environment.

In this context, the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) hosted an online panel discussion to explore how Gulf politics is adapting to these changes. Drawing on insights from An Introduction to Gulf Politics by Khalid Almezaini and Kristian Alexander, the discussion examined key current issues shaping the region, including US-Gulf relations, regional security dynamics, and the broader implications of a shifting global order. Bringing together leading experts, the panel will offer timely perspectives on the Gulf’s evolving role in regional and international politics.

Khaled Al-Mazani

• An Introduction to Gulf Politics was created to meet the growing global academic and policy interest in the Gulf region over the last 15-20 years, consolidating scattered literature into a comprehensive, accessible introduction for newcomers and students.
• The book covers a wide range of topics beyond foreign policy and international relations, including the history of the Gulf states, state formation, political regimes, oil and rentierism, religion and politics, migration, conflict, security, and regional integration.
• The recent Israel-U.S. war against Iran cemented the reality of Iran as a threat to the GCC, prompting the states to project a unified front but there is a crisis of differing threat perceptions and foreign policy approaches among the GCC members regarding Iran. Each state has its own calculation, and foreign policy ties with the U.S. and Israel are further contributing to this fragmentation, despite the collective perception of Iran as a threat.
• The static GCC architecture has been put to the test since the war broke out, raising questions about whether there will be further intra-GCC security cooperation or whether the GCC is unable to function without a strong security umbrella that can bring all 6 member states together.
• There is a growing consensus among the Gulf public that Iran is one of the two ideologically driven regional ‘predators’, the other being Israel; with one trying to export its revolution and proxy networks that are increasingly causing instability and the other using brute force through military means to achieve its goals.

Kristian Alexander

• The book bridges the gap between international relations theory and the Middle East/Gulf region, moving beyond abstract discussions by providing a more nuanced and grounded political, historical and cultural understanding of Gulf politics that counters simplistic stereotypes.
• “Security and the Gulf Threat Perception” chapter argues that Gulf security today involves multidimensional threats, external, internal, and “intermestic” (overlapping domestic and international). Threat perceptions in the Gulf context are intensified due to deep historical rivalries, sectarianism, ideological tensions and reliance on external powers like the US.
• The chapter also discusses the Gulf’s dependence on the US for security guarantees but also the emerging doubts due to perceived US retrenchment and strategic ambiguity, leading to fears of abandonment or entrapment.
• Among the GCC states, the threat perception of Iran differs based on geographic proximity, historic conflict, or ideological difference. States like Saudi and the UAE perceive Iran as a conventional military, ideological threat while Bahrain’s tension is along ideological and historic faultlines and states like Oman in contrast pursue a pragmatic and mediation engagement.
• Israel threat perception, on the other hand, the chapter argues, has evolved differently with some Gulf states after the Abraham Accords however the recent conflicts in the region, including the war against Iran has complicated the image, with higher threat perceptions in regard to its military actions and less opportunistic view.
• There are new security partnerships involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and possibly Qatar, but they are likely functional and flexible alignments focused on missile defense, cyber, maritime security, and intelligence sharing rather than a formal alliance like NATO.

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

• The chapter, “Conflict and Wars in the Gulf,” portrays the current conflict as one episode, going back 20 years, in a long list of Gulf leaders’ struggles to align with often inconsistent US regional policies, citing past events like the Iraq War, Arab Spring, JCPOA negotiations, and 2019 attacks on Gulf states.
• The Gulf frustration with the US response to attacks on Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2019, the chapter highlights, includes Trump’s public statement distinguishing US and Gulf interests, which fueled Gulf states’ cautious re-engagement with Iran.
• The chapter also stresses that the current U.S.-Israel war on Iran has reinforced perceptions of the US as an unreliable security guarantor and even an agent of instability, prompting Gulf states to diversify partnerships and consider alternatives, including closer ties with Israel.
• Some Gulf states, such as the UAE, leaned into stronger US and Israeli ties, while others remain more cautious or distant, reflecting broader fragmentation in the region’s strategic outlook.
• Gulf states fear that Trump’s unpredictable, inconsistent policies and potential deal with Iran might leave Gulf interests sacrificed, creating uncertainty about the future of the Strait of Hormuz and regional security.

Giacomo Luciani

Professor, University of Geneva, Contributor on Gulf economic models

• “Oil and Rentierism in the Gulf” chapter argues that the current war has caused significant economic damage, particularly threatening diversification strategies and financial stability outside Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have alternative export routes and infrastructure.
• Saudi Arabia and Oman are less dependent on the Gulf waters due to their Red Sea and Indian Ocean coasts, while Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and UAE, the chapter explains, are more vulnerable to disruptions in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, hindering their economic diversification efforts.
• The Gulf states may increasingly invest abroad to safeguard revenues and reduce domestic exposure to regional instability, a move likened to a return to rentierism in economic strategy.
• Current war-resulted disruptions are comparable to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which stalled Kuwait’s leading economic diversification efforts. The chapter warns that prolonged conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz could similarly derail regional economies and oil markets, with uncertain timing for resolution.