Syria in Transition:

Syria’s political transition continues to unfold as the Sharaa government seeks to consolidate control across the country. Despite these efforts, significant challenges persist. Active conflict in northern Syria, alongside rising tensions with Alawite and Druze communities in the south, continues to complicate efforts to establish centralized authority and achieve durable stability.

The regional and international context further adds to this complexity. Regional powers remain deeply influential in shaping Syria’s domestic dynamics. At the international level, the Trump administration’s gradual engagement with Sharaa’s government has created cautious optimism regarding Syria’s economic recovery and political reintegration. However, the country’s recovery remains constrained by ongoing sanctions, which continue to hinder reconstruction and broader economic stabilization.

These developments raise critical questions about Syria’s future trajectory. To examine these issues, the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) convened a panel of experts to provide regional and international perspectives on Syria’s evolving landscape. The discussion addressed key questions, including: Can Sharaa’s government effectively consolidate authority nationwide? Will the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the central government find a sustainable path toward reconciliation? How will Syria manage the role of external actors and competing regional interests? And what role can international actors play in supporting Syria’s long-term stabilization?

Dareen Khalifa

• The SDF controls roughly a third of Syrian territory and key natural resources, however, it has never had a strategy to maintain this position indefinitely. The long-term objective has been to negotiate an arrangement that will allow them to preserve some of what they have- but not all- under continued U.S. security backing.
• Damascus rejects any arrangement resembling Northern Iraq’s KRG model. While administrative and military technicalities may be negotiable, political autonomy in Kurdish areas is not.
• Neither Damascus nor Turkey is willing to maintain the current status quo indefinitely. Between full dismantlement of the SDF and preserving existing arrangements lies a wide spectrum of political, security and military options that Damascus may be open to negotiating.
• Western donors should not withdraw engagement, as external economic support will be critical to stabilizing the transition. It is premature to reduce humanitarian assistance or accelerate large- scale refugee returns from European countries.
• The economy will be central to the emerging social contract, alongside security and minority inclusion. The trajectory of the economy, and how external powers and investors engage with it, will be decisive in determining whether the transition stabilizes or fractures.
• S. mediation has played a key role in facilitating indirect engagement between Syria and Israel. Increased public visibility and shifting military realities have narrowed Damascus’s room for concessions compared to a year ago.
• Gulf states have played a constructive role in Syria by pairing investment with support for governance reform and technical expertise. Despite exceeding expectations, their financial engagement remains insufficient to Syria’s reconstruction and humanitarian needs.

Ibrahim Al-Assil

• The SDF leadership missed opportunities in 2025 to secure a better deal, misreading both domestic and geopolitical dynamics. The SDF’s demands for governance and pluralism were not reflected in their own model, which did not deliver those outcomes locally.
• Kurdish leaders Mazulom Abdi and Ilham Ehmed could emerge as national Syrian political leaders by extending their influence from the northeast toward Damascus and the broader political arena, positioning themselves to shape both domestic and regional dynamics.
• Current government practices in Syria have attracted politically motivated investors willing to take risks for political calculations but legal uncertainty and institutional instability deter profit-driven investors, limiting the scale of independent, long-term investment required for reconstruction
• Some business sectors previously aligned with the anti-Assad coalition may feel excluded from the emerging social contract, which could create new political tensions and fragmentation within former anti-Assad coalitions.
• While most sanctions have been removed, some designations remain and there is ongoing discussion about potential reimposition. This creates uncertainty for investors and a ‘sanctions hangover’, slowing confidence and economic engagement.
• There is a clear distinction between international expectations of stability and Syrians’ need for economic growth and an improved quality of life. Stability alone will not attract investment unless it is accompanied by a stronger legislative environment, effective domestic governance, robust legal frameworks, and greater transparency.

Charles Lister

• Both sides of the SDF- Damascus agreement have demonstrated flexibility and early pragmatism, but they fundamentally disagree on the end point. Damascus expects the full integration into state authority from the SDF, while the SDF publicly emphasizes semi-autonomy, self governance and maintaining military brigades.
• Despite the government operating with deficiencies in security services and salaries in 2025, 2026 is expected to bring domestic pressure.
• Overall violence has declined over the past 14 months in Syria, and the government believes the security trajectory is trending positively, though far from fully resolved.
• The government overstated the speed of economic recovery; structural economic improvement will take time. MOUs did not translate into immediate investment, contributing to public frustration and strikes. Structural challenges are becoming more pronounced, especially now that the Caesar Act is no longer an obstacle ‘on paper’.
• S. policy is expected to remain security-first, prioritizing counter-ISIS operations, limiting Iranian re-entry into Syria, and cooperating regionally on counter-drug efforts. Internal criticism within the U.S. is unlikely to significantly alter this trajectory.
• The U.S., like regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Jordan, appears to be operating on a long-term calculation that supporting Syria through a difficult multi-year transition could generate broader regional dividends.